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How will international law deal with the problems of large-scale 
cooperation the peoples of the world now face and will continue to face in 
the future? This is the very big question that Joel Trachtman deals with 
in his book The Future of International Law.1 Trachtman’s book builds on 
a theme from Wolfgang Friedmann’s classic 1964 book, The Changing 
Structure of International Law. Friedmann argues that international law 
is moving, and should move, from an international law of coexistence, 
governing inter-state diplomacy, to an international law of cooperation, 
governing “the pursuit of common human interests.”2 Trachtman argues 
that “international law may grow in a way similar to municipal law: 
establishing basic property rights and rules of security first and turning 
to creation of public goods and regulatory purposes later.”3 International 
law, according to Trachtman, “evolves functionally: it changes as its 
constituents determine new uses.”4 In this rich account, Trachtman 
shows how international law will have to be more extensive, broader in 
scope, more comprehensive in the kinds of things it regulates, and more 
* Chair in Commercial Law, Durham University, Durham Law School. Formerly
Head of College, Swansea University College of Law. This Article benefitted from 
presentation at the Global Challenges—Global Law symposium held at Swansea University 
on 6–7 June 2013. Many thanks to the participants for discussion and comments. A special 
thanks to Joel Trachtman for comments on a draft of this article. All errors are mine. 
1. JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: GLOBAL GOVERNMENT 
(2013) [hereinafter FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW]. 
2. WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW i
(1964). 
3. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 1.
4. Id. at 1.
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effective, to deal with “expected changes in globalization, economic 
development, demography, technology and democracy.”5 International 
lawyers should readily appreciate the basic insight of the book, as they 
divide their work between the law of coexistence of states and matters of 
a regulatory nature. 
The book’s subtitle is boldly phrased “Global Government.” 
Trachtman does not suggest that there will be any such thing as a world 
state with a world government.6 Rather, the first sentence of the book 
captures his claim: “International law is the precursor of international 
government, and international government is nothing more than an 
intensification of international law.”7 Trachtman favors “government” 
over “governance” because he wants to focus on the “formal rules and 
organizations: law.”8 He rejects the notion that a “certain institutional 
intensity or scale is required in order for a mechanism to be considered 
governmental.”9 Rather, government is “infinitely scalable” and it is 
therefore “easy to say that international government exists.”10 According 
to Trachtman, describing the government established by international 
law as “rudimentary” because it does not look like national governments 
is wrong given that the functions of these two sorts of governments 
differ.11 Perhaps the reason why Trachtman contends that it is easy to 
say that international government exists is because he bases his work on 
the idea of the “function” of international law and organization. Early 
work dealing with functionalism in international law and organization, 
which Trachtman cites, contends that if increasing functions are given to 
international organizations, loyalties to these organizations might 
follow.12 
Trachtman’s emphasis on functionality should be understood in the 
context of the methodological toolkit he uses, found in new institutional 
economics, in which he includes constitutional economics as a subfield.13
Trachtman is one of the most preeminent proponents of this particular 
school of thought as a way of understanding international law. His 2008 
5. Id. at 2.
6. Id. at 11.
7. Id. at 7.
8. Id. at 8.
9. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 9.
10. Id. at 9.
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id. at 13–16; see also DAVIE MITRANY, THE PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT (1933). 
13. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 13.
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book, The Economic Structure of International Law,14 is one of the most 
influential on the economics of international law and has become 
required reading in the field. 
In this Article, I examine and critique two parts of The Future of 
International Law. I then go on to explore how custom will fare in the 
future of international law, as that future is understood in the book. 
First, I deal with what I call the contractarian features of Trachtman’s 
explanation for the existence and purpose of international law. Using the 
tools of new institutional economics and constitutional economics, 
Trachtman seeks to describe the features of an international legal 
system. This is positive political theory or at least relates substantially to 
the methods of positive political theory. I want to suggest a different 
approach to understanding international law, one which connects to 
normative political theory. In its ambitious sense, this approach sees 
international law essentially as a form of moral argument, and in its 
modest sense, which I favor, it offers a procedure for moral justification of 
international law distinct from a conceptual analysis to identify it as law. 
Second, I reframe what Trachtman calls the “fragmentation” of 
international law to expose it to moral critique. The problem of 
fragmentation, as Trachtman and others see it, is that there is no single 
international legal system, but rather, distinct regulatory regimes, in 
international law. Trachtman’s functional approach looks at 
fragmentation as a practical problem of international law not reaching its 
full functional potential. I contend that fragmentation poses a serious 
moral problem for international law, in addition to the practical problem 
that Trachtman identifies. Finally, I address the role of customary 
international law. Does it have a role in an international law of 
cooperation? I agree with Trachtman that it does and that its role will be 
supplementary and diminished. In the future of international law, it is 
likely that custom will play a role as part of the general international law 
applicable to the various fragmented lex specialias of treaty obligations. 
We must, moreover, be careful to distinguish custom from general 
principles of law and other sources of international law. 
I.  A CONTRACTARIAN EXPLANATION OR PREDICTION FOR THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Future of International Law relies on a contractarian theory 
about international law. In this section, I very briefly set forth the 
14. JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC STRUCTURE]. 
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groundwork for this contractarian account. It is what we might 
understand as positive political theory, about the way constitutions 
might actually form or around how constitutionalization might actually 
occur. It might be more broadly understood as connecting to a 
contractarian form of moral argument, but this first requires that we 
accept that law could be understood or justified from a moral point of 
view. If we accept the moral account, what we are saying is that the 
formal structure of norms in international law is either contractarian or 
should be so to be morally justifiable and that these questions can be 
answered in a rational bargaining account. Trachtman is an influential 
proponent of the economic but not necessarily the moral version of 
contractarianism. He appears to only accept contractarianism as a 
description or explanation of international law or to use it in predicting 
the future of international law, but not as a form of moral argument 
about international law or its justification. Below I connect the rational 
bargaining model to a philosophical tradition. Much economic thinking 
historically grounds in some philosophical tradition (Hobbes, Hume, J.S. 
Mill, etc.), and we may as well identify at least some of the connections 
relevant to our concerns here if we are going to be clear on what 
economists are doing. I identify the main elements of the bargaining 
account as Trachtman has set forth in the book, and I also set forth my 
account, which could be classified as normative political theory, and 
which could be understood as in the tradition of contractualist moral 
theory. A contractualist form of argument about the law situates around 
the idea that the law must be reasonably acceptable, or more closely to 
T.M. Scanlon’s formulation, around principles for the general regulation 
of behavior that no one, suitably morally motivated, could reasonably 
reject.15 I advocate that another way to justify the norms of international 
law is through contractualism. Contractualism as moral and political 
philosophy predicts nothing. Rather, it provides a way to justify law from 
a moral point of view. I have given the reader almost nothing but a 
skeleton of how we shall proceed, so bear with me as we work out the 
argument. 
Let’s start with Trachtman’s contractarian account. It is set forth in 
more detail in his earlier book, The Economic Structure of International 
Law, but his latest book provides a shorter yet adequate account for our 
purposes here. Chapter 3 of The Future of International Law deals with 
the function of international law and organization as a “system of 
15. T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 5 (1998) [hereinafter WHAT WE 
OWE]. 
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transnational political linkage.”16 In that chapter, Trachtman argues: 
The future of international law is a set of functional, nuanced, 
differentiated, and organic links between the political systems of different 
states. As these links grow in terms of their mandatory character, 
specificity, and institutional support, they will increasingly ascend the 
scale from a more contractual type of international law to mechanisms 
that appear to have more of the characteristics of government.17  
Using the insights of game theory, Trachtman develops a “policy-
exchange contractual theory of international law, focusing on the 
advancement of domestic preferences through international law.”18  
Chapter 11 of The Future of International Law deals with 
international law from a constitutional standpoint. The chapter outlines 
three functions for international constitutional norms: enabling, 
constraining, and supplementing.19 An enabling norm aids in the 
formation of international law. A constraining norm limits the formation 
of international law. A supplementing norm fills gaps in domestic 
constitutional law, arising from globalization.20 The discussion of the 
constitutional aspects of international law is grounded in constitutional 
economics and relies substantially on the work of Nobel laureate James 
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, who pioneered the field in such works as 
The Calculus of Consent.21 As Trachtman explains: 
Under this approach, constitutions are simply instruments of human 
interaction: mechanisms by which to share authority in order to facilitate 
the establishment of rules. In Buchanan’s phrase, they are instruments to 
facilitate gains from trade—not from trade in the conventional sense, but 
transactions in authority. In a transaction cost or strategic model, 
constitutions are assumed to be designed to overcome transaction costs or 
strategic barriers to Pareto superior outcomes. Once this is accepted, it 
follows that constitutional rules are not natural law; instead, they are 
16. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 41.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 64.
19. Id. at 254.
20. Id. at 255.
21. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF 
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).  
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political settlements designed to maximize the achievement of individual 
citizens’ preferences.22 
There is a lot to unpack in this quote, and it is a good launching point 
for working out what economic contactarianism is and what its 
alternatives are. 
The above quote suggests that we have two choices, either a 
contractarian or a natural law account.23 If we look at the history and 
theory of international law, the natural law tradition was influential 
from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The “Grotian view” of 
international law, as Philip Bobbit explains, “was taken to mean the 
assertion of a duty on the part of the individual state to serve the 
interests of the society of states as a whole” and is to be distinguished 
from a “Hobbesian view” that “international society can have no legal 
rules because there is no sovereign to organize and maintain the 
collaboration among states . . . .”24 The Grotian view may be traced to 
thinkers pre-dating Grotius, such as the Spanish Scholastics de Vitoria 
and de Soto, as well as to Gentili, who held the post of Regius Professor of 
Civil Law at Oxford.25 When the law and economics scholars became 
prominent in the twentieth century, they were using logical positivist 
models of economics, which exclude ethics, morality, and connections to 
the history of ideas. In this sense, their approaches could be seen as 
22. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 260.
23. Legal positivists have been criticized for ignoring international law. For the latest
foray, see Jeremy Waldron, International Law: “A Relatively Small and Unimportant” Part 
of Jurisprudence?, in LUÍS DUARTE D’ALMEIDA, JAMES EDWARDS & ANDREA DOLCETTI, 
READING HLA HART’S THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209–23 (2013). Bentham invented the phrase 
“international law.” JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970); see also THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM (John Bowring ed., 1843); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 231 (1961). 
Bentham was referring to a law of coexistence. It is widely understood that Hart’s famous 
Chapter 10 in The Concept of Law was meant to be a favorable treatment to be contrasted 
with those of earlier positivists. The difficulties that legal positivism has encountered in 
elucidating the concept of international law are historical, but its contemporary version, 
which has left the need for a sovereign behind, should encounter no special difficulties. 
Legal positivism sometimes gets misunderstood because it is falsely associated with the 
need for a sovereign law-giver or with a blind obedience to an unrealistic notion that what 
counts as positive law must only be municipal law. 
24. PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE AND THE COURSE OF 
HISTORY 513 (2002). 
25. Martti Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish
Contribution, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (2011); Randall Lesaffer, The Classical Law of Nations 
(1500-1800), in ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND 
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 408 (2011); DAVID ARMITAGE, FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
HISTORY OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT 9 (2013). 
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alternatives to the natural law tradition in what was known as the law of 
nations to the natural lawyers. This narrative provides a sense of 
progress, which may indeed be a false sense, from a law of nations, a law 
of coexistence, to a full-fledged international law of cooperation. 
Friedmann says in his classic work that “the principal preoccupation of 
the classical international law, as formulated by Grotius and the other 
founders, was the formalization and the establishment of generally 
acceptable rules of conduct in international diplomacy.”26 Trachtman says 
that “[t]his was an international law of coexistence.”27 
This is a debate that continues to this day. There appears to be the 
beginnings of a new natural law turn in international law. In a 
posthumously published article in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Ronald 
Dworkin advocates a “return to what I take to be the golden age of the 
subject, seventeenth-century European politics, to an at least partially 
moralized conception of international law.”28  
I have a few worries about the suggested duality between natural law 
tradition of international law versus the economics of international law. 
It is incomplete. From the philosophical, as opposed to the economic side 
of the argument, it jumps from the early modern to the contemporary. It 
leaves out the eighteenth century and a good deal of what went on in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It skips the Enlightenment. Why 
skip Kant? This is something of a recurring theme in international law, 
given that the field is widely accepted to have risen from the Grotian 
view. International lawyers have characterized the divide somewhat 
differently from Trachtman—as one between natural law and legal 
positivism.29 I do not want to suggest a strict adherence to Kant here or to 
his work on international society, Towards Perpetual Peace.30 And, I 
certainly do not want to ignore the considerable Kantian tradition in 
26. FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 5.
27. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 3.
28. Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2,
13 (2013). Recently, Jeremy Waldron has argued for a contemporary jus gentium to discern 
common legal principles that state legal systems share, to regulate relations within states. 
See generally JEREMY WALDRON, “PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND:” FOREIGN LAW 
IN AMERICAN COURTS (2012). Waldron wants us to use Dworkin’s concept of principles 
across municipal legal traditions. These moves by Dworkin and Waldron roughly parallel 
the concepts of jus inter gentes and jus gentium, though it is by no means clear that they 
want us to treat the formal legal categories as entirely distinct. 
29. Friedmann exposes the arguments and concludes that a natural law approach to
the evolution of international law “is not a solution but a camouflaging of the real 
problems.” FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 77. But, note that Friedmann took what might be 
considered to be the wrong view of positivism. 
30. Immanuel Kant, Towards Perpetual Peace, in IMMANUEL KANT PRACTICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 317 (Mary J. Gregor, ed. & trans., 1996) (first published in German in 1795). 
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international law.31 We should not forget that Kant criticized Grotius, 
Pufendorf, and Vattel as “sorry comforters” of a status quo supporting 
offensive war.32  
The project I advocate here is something like that of normative 
jurisprudence about domestic law. While recognizing that, in the history 
of ideas since about the seventeenth century, there has been a division 
between internal and external affairs of state, and between municipal 
and international law, this intellectual history should not be ignored.33 
Though he was writing about how-to-do moral philosophy, I follow Tom 
Hill’s lead: A line of work with Kantian aspirations that does not strictly 
adhere to Kant’s practical philosophy can flourish. Kantian-inspired 
moral theorists, sometimes known as Neo-Kantians, respect the dignity 
of each person in their accounts and decide upon moral principles from an 
“impartial” standpoint.34 In fact, a variety of moral theories that would 
violate fundamental precepts of Kantian moral theory are still widely 
accepted as Kantian inspired. Contractualism is one of them.35  
The distinction I want to draw is between contractualism and 
contractarianism. It is a distinction made by Samuel Freeman, between 
interest-based and right-based contractarianism, though, following 
Stephen Darwall, I and others use the word “contractualism” for the 
right-based version.36 I contend that a suitable, Kantian-inspired 
procedure of moral justification for international law can be developed 
along contractualist lines. The basic elements of a contractualist account 
to law or morality would include the following:37 
a. Justification to others. This element is usually formulated as a
requirement that we justify our action on general principles to regulate 
our behavior on terms others must reasonably accept, or in Scanlon’s 
formulation, no one can reasonably reject. Think of these notions in terms 
31. For just two examples: see, e.g., FERNANDO R. TESÓN, A PHILOSOPHY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998); Amanda Perreau-Saussine, Immanuel Kant on International 
Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas 
eds., 2010). 
32. Kant, supra note 30, at 326.
33. ARMITAGE, supra note 25, at 10.
34. THOMAS E. HILL, VIRTUE, RULES AND JUSTICE 1, 197, 201–02 (2012).
35. Let’s bracket as beyond our limited discussion here T. M. Scanlon, How I Am Not
a Kantian, in DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS, VOLUME TWO 116 (2011). 
36. Samuel Freeman, Moral Contractarianism as a Foundation for Interpersonal
Morality, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN MORAL THEORY 57 (James Drier ed., 2006) 
[hereinafter Moral Contractarianism]; STEPHEN DARWALL, CONTRACTARIANISM/ 
CONTRACTUALISM (2002). 
37. What follows is influenced by Friedmann. See FRIEDMANN, supra note 2.
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of demands a person might make on another person, or an obligation a 
person might have to another person. We give content to demands, 
obligations, and judgments about right and wrong. That content comes 
from putting ourselves in the place of others, and those others doing the 
same for us.  
b. Reasonableness not rationality. Reasonableness relates to the idea of
justification to others. My demands have to be reasonable to you and 
yours to me. Reasonableness specifies the normative. Rationality, in 
contrast, concerns how people actually behave. We want people to act 
reasonably, but their actual behavior may conform to means-ends 
rationality or to some other norm, as human behavior is understood from 
the standpoint of behavioral economics, psychology, or other social 
sciences. Rational behavior can be unreasonable and does not form the 
basis for moral principles. 
c. Moral equality. In contractualism, each person is of equal dignity and
respect. Moral equality affects the way we understand moral 
accountability to each other. It is a basic notion that affects what is 
permissible in a hypothetical agreement and the reasonableness of 
putative moral principles. 
d. Idealized deliberation and hypothetical agreement. Contractualist moral
theories rely on hypothetical agreement among moral equals, usually in 
some sort of idealized conditions such as Rawls’s veil of ignorance in the 
original position. Scanlon argues that we can deliberate hypothetically 
without Rawls’s conditions.38 What is left in the culmination of this work 
out are principles with the weakest objections to them. Contractualist 
methods do not aggregate interests except in limited conditions. 
Agreement is not the subject of a bargain. Bargaining permits people to 
take power and position into account and can lead to unreasonable 
principles.  
e. Normative not naturalistic. Contractualism is not social science. It is
justificatory and not predictive. It is not designed to offer predictions 
about the way people actually behave or about how institutions might 
arise as a result of incentives and behavior. People may actually behave 
38. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 15, at 5.
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quite differently from the way they should behave if judged by the 
standards of properly deliberating moral agents. Contractualism is a 
theory about how persons justify their behavior to others in a moral sense. 
It is not a theory external to the way people actually reason morally. 
Rather, the focus is gaining clarity on the form of the moral argument. Its 
method of justification, however, wide reflective equilibrium, requires us 
to take into account all considered judgments, not just moral judgments, 
particularly when extended into the realm of law and public policy.39 Such 
questions help us to articulate moral principles that are suitably 
interpersonal and agent relative. 
f. Nonreductionist. Contractualism is what Samuel Freeman calls right-
based, which means that moral principles are not explained by some other 
non-moral facts, such as self-interest or prudence.  
g. General principles for the regulation of human action and deliberation.
Hypothetical agreement can result in general principles to regulate 
human action. Here, moral principles can be used to evaluate or justify 
legal rules. 
h. Actual world application. Though the hypothetical agreement is one of
idealized conditions, the principles it produces make claims on actual 
persons in the actual world.  
i. Interpersonal and agent relative. In its notion of agreement,
contractualism takes into account the reasonable plans, purposes, and 
relationships of moral agents. Things that give a person’s life meaning are 
taken into account. The truth of moral judgment depends on these 
personal interests. 
With these basic elements at hand, we can see why contractualism is 
to be distinguished from contractarianism. Both approaches share the 
notion of agreement among persons, but from there they differ 
considerably. In interest-based contractarianism, self-interested persons 
make bargains relating to cooperation or (coexistence) based on rational 
self-interest. Rationality in an interest-based contractarian world is 
means-end rationality. Interest-based contractarianism gives content to 
legal rules as reflecting the outcomes of hypothetical bargains in which 
39. SAMUEL FREEMAN, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 18–20 (2007).
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persons are permitted to take their rational self-interest into account. 
Justification to others has no role. Partiality is entirely acceptable and 
indeed quite predictable in contractarianism. People, and in the case of 
international society, states, can freely use their power in contractarian 
bargaining to get what they want. In right-based contractualism, persons 
reach agreement on the terms of their cooperation (and coexistence) 
based on impartiality and standards of reasonableness. Right-based 
contractualism justifies legal rules as reflecting the outcomes of 
hypothetical agreements that no moral agent could reasonably reject. In 
a contractualist world, states are required to take impartial standpoints 
in dealing with other states in international law-making activities and 
international law would have to comply with moral principles 
appropriately suited to international institutions.  
It is important that we clarify the concepts we are using. Trachtman’s 
contractarianism is economic. He does not deploy it in a strategy of moral 
justification. Rather, his argument is predictive and explanatory. It is 
social science. As an explanatory or predictive theory, Trachtman 
carefully identifies the limits of cooperation. Cooperation is unlikely 
unless it is in the interests of the participants to cooperate and 
transaction costs are low enough. But, if these conditions exist, then what 
would be the purpose of law in the first place? This is a Coasean ideal in 
which people can bargain to an efficient result regardless of the law. In 
the domestic variants of this model, when transaction costs are high 
enough, we need a sovereign. If we need a sovereign, we have to accept 
the Hobbesian view: no law without a sovereign. This reasoning played 
out in the literature when economic accounts of international law were 
beginning to take hold.40 Trachtman comes out on the side of 
international law. His basic claim is that international law is the form 
that state cooperation takes.  
Trachtman’s economic contractarianism and my moral 
contractualism are complementary in their roles. If we enter into the 
realm of cooperation, and we value law from a moral point of view, then 
we need a theory-like contractualism to justify that cooperation. We 
might use game theory to predict when cooperation might occur or to 
evaluate actual compliance with the law, but the law itself should also 
have the sort of moral legitimacy that a contractualist procedure of moral 
justification can provide, if we value law’s legitimacy in a moral sense. 
The easy acceptance of the use of power for private gain in the moral 
40. Compare TRACHTMAN, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 14, at ix–xi, and
ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008), 
with JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). 
72 RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:61 
version of contractarianism is problematic for norm formation in 
international law.  
Why not simply do as Dworkin says and return to the humanist 
“golden age?” After all, contractualism, as well as contractarianism, is 
typically associated with the social contract tradition. Should we not limit 
its relevance to what happens in states? I offer three responses to these 
doubts.  
First, contractualism as a moral theory is about the form of moral 
argument, not about the political obligations of citizens to each other in 
states.41 Second, as explained above, the humanist tradition in 
international law was designed for an international law of coexistence, 
and frankly, justified some questionable action. It produced the worst 
sorts of justifications for colonial expansion, offensive war, predation, and 
exploitation. In a world of pervasive global cooperation, we need a theory 
to deliver a justification for law to set that cooperation in motion in a way 
that appeals to the considered moral convictions of peoples in societies 
who may be in worse-off positions than monarchs and trading companies, 
or in the contemporary context, elites, the rich and powerful, and 
multinational enterprises. 
Consider these issues from the standpoint of trade. Trade was central 
to the humanism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which 
conceptualized as natural the connection between use of force and 
freedom to trade. The natural lawyers argued, among other things, that 
freedom to trade is a natural right; that man cannot establish 
institutions to get in the way of free trade; that land, if not properly 
cultivated and used productively in a European sense, could be freely 
appropriated because it is God’s creation being wasted; and that self-help 
to enforce nature’s law is justified.42 Humanist-inspired accounts may not 
41. See T.M. Scanlon, The Aims and Authority of Moral Theory, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1992). 
42. See generally RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL 
THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT (1999); MARTINE JULIA 
VAN ITTERSUM, PROFIT AND PRINCIPLE: HUGO GROTIUS, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES AND 
THE RISE OF DUTCH POWER IN THE EAST INDIES (1595–1615) (2006); Peter Borschberg, Hugo 
Grotius’ Theory of Trans-Oceanic Trade Regulation: Revisiting Mare Liberum (1609) 34 
(Inst. of Int’l Law & Justice, Working Paper No. 2005/14, 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=871752. 
Friedmann argues, reminiscent of Bentham, about natural law: “Any attempt to stamp 
a particular social order as being consonant with nature, and correspondingly, another as 
being contrary to nature, is a disguised way of giving the halo of perpetuity and 
sacrosanctity to a particular political or legal philosophy.” FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 78. 
In this passage, Friedmann cites to a work by a well-known arbitrator of the time, F.A 
Mann, who argued that the payment of prompt, full, and adequate compensation in a 
nationalization of a foreign investment is a principle of natural law. These principles were 
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need to go down this route and can deviate from their intellectual 
ancestors, just as Kantian-inspired accounts do. Whether they will lose 
something fundamental about the natural in such a progression remains 
to be seen.  
Third, strategies of moral justification influenced by the 
Enlightenment have been successful in identifying the moral relevance of 
institutions. Continuing with the trade discussion, in the sort of large-
scale cooperation that Trachtman addresses in The Future of 
International Law, trade requires institutions. Institutions comprising a 
global order for economics and commerce create what Matthias Risse 
calls shared membership in the global order.43 Institutions are human-
created social practices. Markets are not natural entities like planets or 
trees. They do not exist in a state of nature. Their structure is not 
inevitable, existing outside the reach of any government. In fact, their 
structure depends on government. How we design markets is up to us 
and based on what we value. The inequality that comes from markets is 
within our control. When we deliberate about what we value, it is 
unlikely that we will only consider economic efficiency or economic liberty 
as relevant. We might want some form of fairness to set the terms of a 
cooperative endeavor, though we might disagree on what fairness 
requires. If it is the case that markets cannot exist without institutions, 
or cannot exist to the extent that they do as national and global 
economies without institutions, then we might want to be able to justify 
economic inequality brought about or perpetuated by these institutions. 
We also want to know how state power in trade negotiations may be 
exercised legitimately. These are questions that contractualism is well-
equipped to answer. 
Contractualism is about the moral legitimacy of international law. It 
might come into the formation of international law if we accept that 
states (and their officials) have what Dworkin calls a duty to improve the 
moral legitimacy of international law.44 Contractualist principles might 
also lead to particular reactive attitudes about the actions of states and 
their officials. But, even with contractualism as a moral theory, we still 
need a way to pick out which social practices are norms of international 
law. We could adopt Dworkin’s strategy and fuse concepts about law into 
a form of moral argument. I suggest a less ambitious approach, cohering 
with the distinction between analytical and normative jurisprudence 
probably controversial at the time of Friedmann’s writing, before the rise of neoliberal 
economic order starting in the late 1980s. 
43. See MATTHIAS RISSE, ON GLOBAL JUSTICE (2012).
44. Dworkin, supra note 28, at 19–22. Is this a theme about duty of officials going
back to Wasserman? 
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about domestic law and with the way that many moral philosophers 
engage with questions of moral justification.  
How we go about picking out which social practices are norms of 
international law will depend on the beliefs and attitudes of persons who 
use and are subject to the law. Subordination to a hierarchy known as a 
sovereign is unnecessary for a positivist account of the law. As Alexander 
Orakhelashvili explains:  
It is . . . difficult to see how the positiveness of law—that its postulation in 
an externally intelligible manner to repeatedly apply to facts covered by 
its content—inherently includes the element of subordination through 
command. It is right to say that such subordination is one way of creating 
positive law but portraying such subordination as the necessary condition 
for that would entail a logical conceptual overstretch.45
My account of a transnational conception of legal positivism tries to 
dissolve the notion of the sovereign as an enabling condition for the law. 
A transnational conception of legal positivism, one which removes the 
state as an enabling condition for a legal system, might require that any 
candidate for legal practice meet five conditions: (1) acceptance by the 
participants in the legal system, the norm users, of the rules of the order 
as valid, binding, and authoritative; (2) systemic qualities of normative 
consequence within the putative legal system, making the normative 
order the system represents intelligible or comprehensible to the 
participants; (3) secondary rules and secondary rule officials, though they 
can be distributed across different state and non-state hierarchies, 
serving mainly an epistemological role in assisting in the identification of 
valid legal rules, particularly given conditions; (4) shared agency between 
secondary rule officials demonstrating sufficient mutual responsiveness 
and joint commitment for a legal system; and (5) primary rules dealing 
with issues that legal systems usually deal with, such as property, 
contract, rights, duties, and dispute resolution. The fourth condition 
relies on Scott Shapiro’s planning theory of law, which is based on 
Michael Bratman’s descriptions of shared agency, in particular his notion 
of a shared intentional activity.46 I have used this account to elucidate 
the features of transnational commercial law.47 It can be extended to 
45. Alexander Orakhelashvili, Introduction, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY 
AND HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 8. 
46. SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 119–20 (2011).
47. John Linarelli, Analytical Jurisprudence and the Concept of Commercial Law, 114
PENN STATE L. REV. 119, 198 (2009). 
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fields of international law.48 
II. FRAGMENTATION
In The Future of International Law, Trachtman identifies the 
property of fragmentation in international law. He explains that 
international law is fragmented because “it tends to make and 
administer rules in separate functional categories, often without a clear 
and effective system for integrating the resulting rules.”49 
Fragmentation, according to Trachtman, comes from the “rudimentary” 
nature of international law.50 “Greater integration” of international law 
might be required to deal with particular circumstances: (1) “natural 
overlaps between policy measures”; (2) to facilitate “broader and longer-
term reciprocity when making agreements”; (3) when one type of 
agreement “might serve to balance out the distributive effects” of 
another; and (4) when “economies of scale or scope in the development of 
institutions” exist.51 Fragmentation relates to what Trachtman calls 
“congestion” in international law, the situation in which international 
law is increasingly called upon to regulate more areas or existing areas 
more intensively.52 “With congestion comes collision” and if the collision 
produces undesirable consequences, then we might say it is because of 
the fragmented nature of international law.53 It is a “developmental 
problem of the international governmental system, in which there is a lag 
between congestion and measures to produce coherence.”54
Fragmentation receives ongoing attention in the academic literature.55  
48. John Linarelli, International Law: Practical Authority, Global Justice, 103 AM.
SOC’Y INTL L. PROC. 382, 383 (2010). 
49. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 9.
50. Id. at 9.
51. Id. at 9–10.
52. Id. at 217.
53. Id. at 217.
54. Id. at 222.
55. See, e.g., MARIO PROST, THE CONCEPT OF UNITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2012); Joel Trachtman, The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers, Subsidiarity, 
Fragmentation and Cooperation, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 719 (2010); Eyal Benvenisti, The 
Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007); Tim Stephens, Multiple International Courts and the 
“Fragmentation” of International Environmental Law, 25 AUS. YBIL L. 227 (2006); Bruno 
Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self Contained Regimes in 
International Law, 17 EURO. J. INT’L L. 483 (2006). Martti Koskenniemi deals with 
fragmentation in the context of custom and its codification. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM 
APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 389–97 (2005). 
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A way to understand fragmentation exists which, I think, is 
illuminating, but which may not be obvious to international lawyers. It 
connects to the contractualist discussion of the prior section, and it comes 
from Rawls. Rawls uses the concept of a “well-ordered society” in his 
political philosophy.56 For Rawls, a well-ordered society is one in which 
all reasonable persons within it accept the same public conception of 
justice, their acceptance and the principles of justice are public 
knowledge, and the principles of justice are reflected in the society’s laws 
and institutions, in what Rawls calls the basic structure of society.57 
Well-ordered societies can be “liberal” or “decent.”58 Reasonable members 
of well-ordered liberal societies conceptualize themselves as free and 
equal and as having a liberal conception of justice.59 Reasonable members 
of well-ordered decent societies may accept hierarchy in their societies 
but accept a non-liberal common good conception for their society.60 In 
The Law of Peoples, Rawls argues that the best we could hope for is a 
“reasonably just society of peoples” comprised of these well-ordered 
societies.61 On this foundation, Rawls specifies eight principles, which 
parallel well-accepted doctrines of public international law, citing to 
Brierly’s Law of Nations.62 In effect, Rawls specifies an international law 
of coexistence for well-ordered societies.  
In Rawls’s theory, a well-ordered liberal society has a public 
conception of justice and that conception of justice is implemented in the 
basic structure of society. The basic structure of society includes a 
domestic legal system, though the debate continues about the legal 
categories included in the basic structure of society and hence subject to 
Rawlsian principles of justice.63 We could also draw rough comparisons to 
56. See John Rawls, A Kantian Conception of Equality, in COLLECTED PAPERS 254–55
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). 
57. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 453–54 (rev. ed. 1999); JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 15 (1993); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 8 
(Erin Kelly ed., 2001); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 4–5 (1999) [hereinafter LAW OF 
PEOPLES]. 
58. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 57, at 3.
59. Id. at 3–4.
60. Id. at 4.
61. Id. at 124.
62. Id. at 37 n.42 (citing J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE LAW OF PEACE (6th ed. 1963)). Rawls also cites to TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY AND 
THE RELATIONS OF STATES (1983). Nardin is a political theorist. 
63. See Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Blankfein Tabachnick, The Rawlsian View of
Private Ordering, 25 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 288, 288–89 (2008); Kevin A. Kordana & David H. 
Tabachnick, On Belling the Cat: Rawls and Tort as Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1279, 
1288–90 (2006); Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 598, 598–600 (2005). 
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Raz’s earlier writings about the claims of comprehensiveness, supremacy, 
and openness of municipal legal systems.64 So, at the domestic level, we 
have both a public conception of justice, reflected in the legal system and 
institutions of government of the state in question, and which that legal 
system and these institutions claim to be comprehensive in scope of 
coverage. Trachtman calls this the “gold standard” for a legal system, 
which could be read to mean that he does not ascribe anything essential 
to the properties of a legal system I have just described.65 But I do think 
that there is a significant explanatory power in the distinctions that I am 
drawing here. 
I have just very summarily sketched that part of Rawls’s The Law of 
Peoples offering an ideal theory, an exploration of human possibilities in 
the form of a “realistic utopia.”66 Part of his argument is that we could 
not conceive of a realistic utopia for the world which would require his 
two principles of justice to apply outside of or across societies.67 For 
Rawls, the sort of “social cooperation” (a phrase essential to Rawls’s 
contractualist theory)68 which would be necessary for a realistic utopia of 
global justice,69 implemented through international law and international 
government, would simply be too incredible for us to accept.  
But, if international law evolves into a law of cooperation, and if the 
political philosophers are right that a global basic structure of society 
already exists or is on the rise,70 might we start holding international law 
to something like a public conception of global justice? Is a utopia 
demanding more rigorous principles of justice starting to become more 
realistic? Trachtman argues that fragmentation may or may not be a 
problem depending on the circumstances. I believe it is more generally a 
problem because it relates to a form of social cooperation that would be 
needed for international law to truly become a law of cooperation. 
Fragmentation is not contingent or dependent on circumstances, nor is it 
occasional. It is conceptual. It is a general structural feature of 
international law, applicable across all of the categories of international 
64. If we do so, we should bear in mind the very different projects Raz and Rawls
undertook. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 116–20 
(1979); JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY 
OF LEGAL SYSTEM (1980).  
65. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 27.
66. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 57, at 6.
67. Id. at 36.
68. The citations would be numerous. See, e.g., Rawls, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra
note 57, at 22. 
69. Such a global justice would include distributive justice.
70. Charles Beitz produced the early influential work, but there are many others. See
CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979).  
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law. 
To understand why fragmentation is a serious problem for 
international law, we first need to get clear on what we mean by 
cooperation. In game theory, cooperation is something to be predicted; the 
terms of that cooperation are usually the result of the behavioral 
assumptions we make about the players and about their payoffs. 
Cooperation in game theory usually requires a set of conditions to 
produce a narrow set of cooperative outcomes, such as common pools 
resources or limited forms of collective action such as infinitely repeating 
exchanges.71 A more ambitious moral approach to game theoretic 
cooperation is the rational bargaining solution to social cooperation, 
discussed above, an interest-based contractarian account.72 The 
difference between economic and moral contractarianism, as explained in 
the prior section, is that the moral contractarian argues that 
contractarianism is a theory about moral justification, in addition to (or 
instead of) being an explanatory and predictive theory about how people 
behave.  
These differences suggest a two-fold classification for understanding 
cooperation: one in which we ask why people cooperate and the other in 
which we ask about the terms of that cooperation. If we are only asking 
why people cooperate and we are trying to predict when cooperation will 
occur, then the terms of the cooperation might not be so important to us. 
In these cases, fragmentation may not concern us, or at least not concern 
us in all cases. But, if we evaluate the terms of that cooperation, then 
fragmentation becomes a bigger problem. If we evaluate fragmentation 
using the terms of cooperation set by familiar moral concepts of right or 
good, which require that cooperation help people lead decent lives, then 
fragmentation means there is no cooperation, and that cooperation has 
failed in a moral sense, even if it is succeeding in a predictive or economic 
sense.  
Let’s add into the discussion the problem of agency (in an economic 
and not a moral sense) that international law faces. At the international 
level, no “government” exists that might be said to be an agent of people, 
at least not directly so. This is a familiar and well-examined issue in 
international law scholarship, one which The Future of International Law 
addresses.73 
71. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 
(1984); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982). 
72. See, e.g., DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); Freeman, Moral
Contractarianism, supra note 36. 
73. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 269, 282–83.
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 International law has a long way to go to get close to being a law of 
cooperation, if we understand cooperation in its moral sense. Though we 
may not be able to hold actual domestic legal systems to Rawlsian ideals 
either, we can say without reservation that international law is seriously 
disordered, more so than at least developed and mature domestic legal 
systems. And with disorder comes fragmentation. This serious disorder 
should not surprise us. It comes from years of power and sovereignty 
being the ultimate arbiter of what counts as international law. 
Examples of serious disorder are numerous. Fragmented regulatory 
regimes are necessarily partial to what they are regulating. An example 
that many like to use is trade and the environment. The World Trade 
Organization Appellate Body made a significant advance in its 
Shrimp/Turtles decision by effectively creating a balancing test for 
evaluating the legality of trade measures to protect the environment. 
General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (“GATT”), article XX(g) 
provides: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures . . . relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.74 
The Appellate Body interpreted GATT, article XX(g) to provide for a 
balancing test: “[T]he measures falling within the particular exceptions 
must be applied reasonably, with due regard both to the legal duties of 
the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of the other parties 
concerned.”75 In finding U.S. measures overbroad and not the least 
restrictive means to achieve non-trade aims, the Appellate Body in 
Shrimp/Turtles ruled that the U.S. failure to engage in international 
efforts to achieve its intended aims weighed against a finding that the 
74. World Trade Organization, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX,
TIAS 1700 (1947). 
75. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶ 151, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (quoting Appellate Body Report, 
United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R 
(May 20, 1996)); see Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 333, 361–64 (1999) [hereinafter Shrimp and Shrimp Products]. 
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U.S. measure was lawful under GATT, article XX(g).76 While dispute 
settlement decisions of this sort go a long way to deal with 
fragmentation, still specialized tribunals are limited in what they can 
achieve. A single counterexample makes the point: there could be a case 
in which an environmental treaty requires a WTO member to do 
something that is clearly not the least restrictive means available from 
the standpoint of international trade, and there is nothing the Appellate 
Body could do other than to rule against the WTO member in any WTO 
dispute settlement proceeding. Of course, this WTO member would 
probably be unlikely to agree to any such treaty in the first place, if the 
WTO lawyers advise him or her that entering into such a treaty would 
violate preexisting WTO obligations. This is an example of how 
fragmentation produces disorder in international law.77 
Fragmentation will persist in the forms of “limited government” we 
currently have in international law and organization. The focus on order 
versus disorder and moral versus economic forms of cooperation hopefully 
can assist in the search for solutions that are both efficacious and just.  
III. WHAT ABOUT CUSTOM?
What is the role of customary international law as international law 
moves towards an international law of cooperation? There seems to be no 
clear position on this question in The Future of International Law, which 
is perhaps telling about the decline in importance in custom if we are to 
move towards an international law of cooperation. In the discussion of 
fragmentation in the book, we receive a clear signal of why this is true. 
To quote, “when customary international law was the primary means for 
making international law, and its products were generally universal, 
fragmentation was a significantly less pressing issue.”78 Two reasons for 
this are offered. First, custom “had the ability to be nuanced, and to take 
into account varying concerns—after all, it was socially rooted in 
behavior, not produced at diplomatic conferences narrowly focused on a 
particular issue.”79 Second, to the extent custom is universal, the problem 
of multiple legislators did not exist.80 Fragmentation, says Trachtman, “is 
largely an artifact of treaty law made in different fora, with different 
76. Id. at ¶¶ 168, 169, 177.
77. Of course, I do not deal with the effects of a subsequent treaty on the legal
obligations under a prior treaty under domestic law. 
78. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 226.
79. Id. at 226.
80. Id. at 226.
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groups of parties.”81 
In his 1964 book, Friedmann foresaw the decline of customary 
international law:  
It is an obvious reflection of the radically different character and methods 
of international relations in our time that custom can no longer be as 
predominant or important a source of law as it was in the formative 
period of international law. [C]ustom is too clumsy and slow moving a 
criterion to accommodate the evolution of international law in our time, 
and the difficulties are increased as the number of subjects of the law of 
nations swells from a small club of Western Powers to 120 or more 
“sovereign” states. More importantly, custom is an unsuitable vehicle for 
international “welfare” or “co-operative” law. The latter demands positive 
regulation of economic, social, cultural and administrative matters, a 
regulation that can only be effective by specific formulation and 
enactment. It is only because the classical international law was 
overwhelmingly concerned with the mutual obligations of abstention and 
tolerance governing the diplomatic intercourse between nations that 
custom, arising out of state practice, could play a predominant role. It 
must be replaced by more articulate and specific instruments of law-
making, i.e. in the absence of an international legislative body, by 
bilateral or multilateral treaties . . . . Even in some of the domains of 
classical international law, as in the various aspects of the Law of the Sea, 
multilateral conventions arising out of the preparatory work of 
international bodies and international conferences, tend to replace 
custom.82 
Friedmann was not simply negative about the role of custom in the 
future of international law. His conclusion was that custom, “while 
plainly inadequate as a major source of modern international law, in the 
rapidly expanding, complex[,] and articulate pattern of modern 
international relations is still an important factor in the evolution or 
modification of the principles of classical international law, governing the 
adjustment of national sovereignties.”83 
Olufemi Elias and Chin Leng Lim, in The Paradox of Consensualism 
in International Law, citing Friedmann, made this point again in the 
1990s, but in the context of providing a defense for custom as an 
81. Id. at 226.
82. FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 121–22.
83. Id. at 123 (citation omitted).
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important source of international law: 
The nature of customary international law (based traditionally as it is on 
the accumulation of the individual practices and perceptions of States) 
and the consequent tardiness in the customary law-making process tend 
to result in the view that international custom is unable to address these 
issues satisfactorily. Customary law would seem to be better suited to an 
international law of coexistence as distinct from the demands of an 
international law of cooperation and interdependence.84 
Elias and Lim went on to argue that a treaty is effective primarily 
when a preexisting “political consensus” supports it.85 In other words, 
“the continued efficacy of a treaty is not a question of treaty law.”86 
In his contractarian account, Trachtman has developed, with George 
Norman, a repeated multilateral prisoner’s dilemma model for the 
formation of and compliance with customary international law.87 In The 
Future of International Law, Trachtman extends this account to deal 
with the decision-making process and lobbying within states and to the 
formation of and compliance with international law generally.88 This 
form of rational cooperation may lead to alternative institutional design 
choices, including treaties. There may also be cases in which customary 
international law might be binding when the conditions of the game are 
not met and those situations just might be the acid test of why customary 
international law has the force that it does, or in the terminology of new 
institutional economics, why customary international law matters.89 
Friedmann can be said to be making five claims about the role of 
custom in a future international law of cooperation. First, he claims that 
custom cannot provide the sort of concrete, fine-grained, positive rules 
necessary for regulation.90 Second, he claims that custom is “too clumsy 
and slow moving” for an international law of cooperation.91 Third, 
84. OLUFEMI A. ELIAS & CHIN LENG LIM, THE PARADOX OF CONSENSUALISM IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 173–74 (1998) [hereinafter CONSENSUALISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW] . 
85. Id. at 190.
86. Id.
87. George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game,
99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541 (2005). 
88. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 54–64.
89. I borrow a catchphrase of new institutional economics loosely here. See Rudolf
Richter, The Role of Law in New Institutional Economics, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13 
(2008); John N. Droback, Law Matters, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 97 (1998). 
90. FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 122.
91. Id. at 122. Elias and Lim use the word “tardiness.” ELIAS & LIM, CONSENSUALISM
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 84. 
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customary international law is meant for a small club of “Western 
powers” and does not reflect the realities of international society.92 
Fourth, customary international law has a limited domain, dealing only 
with coexistence.93 Fifth and finally, Friedmann argues that customary 
international law tends to get replaced by convention anyway as the law 
and activity relating to it becomes more complex.94 Each of these claims 
will be addressed in turn. 
First, the argument that customary international law is unsuitable 
for an international law of cooperation because it does not provide 
concrete, fine-grained, and positive rules seems to fail. Let’s assume for 
the sake of argument that customary rules are more general or open 
textured than treaty rules. This is a dubious generalization, as many 
legal rules found in treaties are similar in the respects that Friedmann 
finds problematic. Compare the most favored nation and national 
treatment provisions of a typical trade treaty with the legal rules of use 
of force in self-defense, for example. That rules have this structure, 
however, does not mean they are unsuitable for a law of cooperation. 
Similar rules are in abundance in the domestic law of political 
communities, in which robust principles of justice are relevant, if one 
accepts the sort of contractualist political theory discussed in the prior 
sections. The codes of legal systems in the civilian tradition are full of 
such general principles, as is judge-made law in countries of the common 
law tradition. The meanings of these simple rules are often “filled in” 
through commentary, by case law, through restatements, and so on. 
These arguments do not require us to accept the naïve notion that 
general rules of law fully determine every case that comes before a court 
or a tribunal. The basic point here is that what Friedmann identifies is 
an issue for law generally, domestic or international, and indeed for any 
sort of cooperation by humans that seek to be governed by rules. 
Second, Friedmann claims that custom is “too clumsy and slow 
moving” for an international law of cooperation.95 Whether this is true 
depends on what international lawyers mean when they refer to 
customary international law. My worry here is that confusion persists on 
that very basic question of a conceptual nature.  
The Statute of the International Court of Justice identifies custom as 
“evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”96 It has been a 
92. FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 122.
93. Id. at 122.
94. Id. at 122.
95. Id. at 122.
96. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat 1031 (entered
into force Oct. 24, 1945). 
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longstanding practice to identify custom using two elements: state 
practice and opinio juris. In the merits decision of the International 
Court of Justice in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua, the court deemphasized the state practice element, finding 
customary international law prohibiting use of force and prohibiting 
intervention from statements such as General Assembly resolutions and 
finding that it was sufficient if state practice was generally consistent 
with statements of rules in such documents.97 The dilution of the state 
practice element is problematic. The decision has been the subject of 
much discussion.98 We want to avoid the problem identified by Sir Robert 
Jennings: “[M]ost of what we perversely persist in calling customary 
international law is not only not customary law; it does not even faintly 
resemble a customary law.”99 Koskenniemi identifies the problem: 
“Sometimes standards are included in custom regardless of whether they 
have been backed by a history of general compliance. ‘Custom’ has 
become a generic name for nearly all non-conventional standards, 
including acts and decisions of international organizations and 
conferences.”100 He laments: 
A remarkable fact about custom is that it is constantly in danger 
collapsing either into tacit agreement or a naturalistic principle. The 
function of a separate doctrine about custom is to make room for a law 
between these two; a law understood in an ascending fashion (as 
agreement) and a law understood in a descending way (as non-consensual 
principle).101  
Conceptual distinctions should be made between rules: (1) derived 
from a reasoning process; (2) seen as self-evident in a natural law sense; 
and (3) identified as social practices, such as customary rules. If we 
ignore these concepts, we risk conflating custom with general principles 
97. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 99100 (June 27); see Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern 
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 758–
59 (2001). 
98. See, e.g., Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law:
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTRALIAN YEARBOOK OF INT’L L. 82 
(1992); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 757 (2001). 
99. Roberts, supra note 97, at 759.
100.  KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 55, at 392 (citation omitted). 
101.  Id. at 397 (citation omitted). 
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of law, another distinct source of international law.102 More generally and 
perhaps more seriously, confusion about concepts could lead to mistakes 
in making determinations about legal obligations. 
Of course, maintaining clarity on the concept of custom does not 
mean that we have to maintain strict formal boundaries around the 
sources of international law. The process of deriving customary norms 
from treaties of widespread significance was partly at issue in both 
Nicaragua and the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the most 
important of ICJ decisions on the role of customary international law.103  
The relevance of this discussion for Friedmann’s second claim is that 
if we dilute the state practice element for the formation of customary 
international law, it will be formed more quickly and so its slow-moving 
formation may be less a worry, though its clumsy nature may still 
persist, whatever that may mean. If the primary inquiry to find custom is 
opinio juris, then judges might have more discretion to find it. The bigger 
worry just might become its coherence. 
Third, Friedmann criticizes customary international law as 
unsuitable for an international law of cooperation because of its 
homogeneity. According to Friedmann, it is meant for a small club of 
“Western powers” and does not reflect the realities of a pluralistic 
international society. This claim seems to contradict the validity criteria 
for custom. We now have to account for an increasing number of states, 
all of which have state practice, and their sense of legal obligation (opinio 
juris) has to be evaluated in any process of identifying custom. These 
facts suggest to us that custom just might be more difficult to find, unless 
we take an ambitious view of Nicaragua and continue to weaken the 
state practice element. Friedmann’s claim may be a product of the times 
of his writing, when post-colonial states struggled to construct a new 
international economic order in which particular aspects of classical 
international law were seen to be in the way of true independence. While 
published sometime after Friedmann’s book, one can sense the tension in 
Prosper Weil’s well-known article lamenting the relative normativity of 
international law, published in the American Journal of International 
Law in 1983.104 
102.  Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat 1031 (entered 
into force Oct. 24, 1945) (“the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”); see 
Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a Divided World, in THE 
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL DOCTRINE, PHILOSOPHY 
AND THEORY (Ronald St. John McDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983). 
103.  Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14; North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (1969). 
104.  Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 413 (1983). On Weil’s article, see John Tasioulas, In Defence of Relative 
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Fourth, Friedmann argued that customary international law has a 
limited domain, dealing only with coexistence. Much of customary 
international law does indeed deal with coexistence. Some of those rules 
on coexistence are fundamental in nature, relating to, for example, the 
lawful use of force.105 The domain of customary international law has to 
be understood in the context of its relationship to other sources, and in 
particular, to treaties. We can think of general international law as 
having a constitutional function in the international legal system. The 
rules of at least universal customary international law are binding on all 
states.106 They may be seen as filling gaps left by treaties.107 Beyond gap 
filling, custom interacts with treaties in a number of nuanced ways. 
Relating to Friedmann’s fifth argument, some treaties codify custom. 
Others go further and reflect progressive development of international 
law. Customary rules may have relevance in treaty regimes on dispute 
settlement.108 Custom may develop out of treaty rules that are widely 
accepted and get incorporated into state practice.109 Treaties may rely on 
custom for various legal standards, and states and tribunals may have to 
resort to this preexisting custom when applying a treaty. Treaty 
interpretation may solidify into custom about the particular meanings of 
treaty provisions.  
Trachtman is right to conclude that custom will have a subsidiary 
role in an international law of cooperation. On this issue, he is well-
supported by Friedmann and others. Returning to Trachtman’s 
functionalism, the various areas of international activity that he has 
identified as in need of more international law will be in need of treaties 
as the primary source of international law. As treaty-making among 
states develops further in the areas of cyberspace and cyber-security, 
environmental protection and public health, global finance, and economic 
liberalization, it would be worth further study at a future date to see 
what has happened to customary international law and to determine 
whether the predictions of this section as to its fate are accurate.  
Normativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaragua Case, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
85 (1996). 
105.  See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Revisited, 1 
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 1 (2002). 
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2014] CONCEPT AND CONTRACT 87 
CONCLUSION 
The Future of International Law performs an important function for 
international law. It guides us on what a new institutional economist 
might call the possibilities for an “institutional design” for a global 
society. Given its grounding in new institutional economics, it is 
pragmatic about the possibilities of cooperation, looking closely at the 
social costs of such cooperation and the strategic behavior of 
international actors. This is important work. 
In his 1977 work, Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer, writing in 
the context of the United Nations Charter as a legal instrument during 
the Cold War, said: “The lawyers have constructed a paper world, which 
fails at crucial points to correspond to the world the rest of us still live 
in.”110 He also argued: 
Policy[-]oriented lawyers are in fact moral and political philosophers, and 
it would be best if they presented themselves in that way. Or, 
alternatively, they are would-be legislators, not jurists or students of the 
law. They are committed, or most of them are committed, to restructuring 
international society—a worthwhile task—but they are not committed to 
expounding its present structure.111 
The divisions Walzer identifies are instructive but may not capture 
fully the work that many academic lawyers undertake, going beyond 
description and exercises in elucidating the internal coherence of 
international law. Many contemporary “policy-oriented” international 
lawyers operate in a middle ground. They are not Kant’s “sorry 
comforters,” nor have they abandoned traditional legal analysis. 
Depending on the tradition in which they work, policy-oriented lawyers 
can use a thorough knowledge of the positive law for critique, in 
evaluation, in putting the law through a procedure of moral justification, 
in developing policy choices, in advising on institutional design, and in 
exposing ideologies. These tasks take both knowledge of the law and an 
understanding of another discipline, usually in the social sciences or 
philosophy. The Future of International Law successfully takes this 
110.  MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS xx–xxi (1977). These arguments remind us of Onora O’Neill’s 
concerns about reliance on positive law of human rights. See ONORA O’NEILL, BOUNDS OF 
JUSTICE 99–100 (2000). 
111.  WALZER, supra note 110, at xxi. Walzer went on to explain his own task to be 
“to account for the ways in which mans and women who are not lawyers but simply citizens 
(and sometimes soldiers) argue about war, and to expound the terms we commonly use.” Id. 
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middle ground and promotes a significant advance of our understanding 
of international law.  
